نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
In the traditional study of the problem of evil and its connection to God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, philosophers have often focused on human pain and suffering. However, a fundamental question arises: which forms of pain and suffering should be counted? If human pain and suffering are considered evil, can the pain and suffering of animals also be regarded as such? Some philosophers affirm this, arguing that animals experience extreme pain, which can bolster the argument from evil against the existence of God. Others contend that suffering requires a sense of self, which animals supposedly lack, making the attribution of suffering to them likely anthropomorphic. In this paper, I address two key questions: (1) Shouldn't the pain and suffering of animals be considered when evaluating the problem of evil? (2) Regardless of the theological implications of current pain and suffering, do theists have the right to inflict pain and suffering on animals to achieve greater human good? My answer to the first question is affirmative, and to the second, negative. I argue that because animals are sentient beings, not only should their pain and suffering be accounted for in theological evaluations of the problem of evil, but humans—including theists—are morally obligated to recognize them as independent beings who should not be exploited as a means to achieve the putative human goods.
کلیدواژهها English
