Linda Zagzebski’s moral philosophy—articulated in two complementary frameworks, Divine Motivation Theory and Exemplarist Moral Theory—offers a systematic reconstruction of religious ethics grounded in virtue, character, and moral motivation. In her earlier theory, the divine character is not merely a source of commands, but the ontological and normative foundation of value, composed of loving, wise, and benevolent motivations. This marks a decisive departure from divine command theories, where God's will determines moral value; for Zagzebski, it is the divine character that grounds the will, not the reverse. In her later exemplarist theory, ethical concepts such as “goodness,” “virtue,” and “duty” are understood not through conceptual analysis but via direct reference to paradigmatically virtuous persons and the cognitive emotion of admiration. Admiration, she argues, initiates moral understanding by directing the agent toward the motivational structure of exemplars, thereby enabling imitation and the development of one’s own character. Crucially, the theory allows for the revision of mistaken admiration and supports moral growth. Though centered on divine exemplarity as the ultimate moral ideal, the theory is designed to be accessible and epistemically fruitful even for non-theists, through its reliance on human exemplars. This paper analyzes the structural unity and philosophical implications of these theories, highlighting both their internal coherence and the epistemological, theological, and intercultural challenges they face. The article argues that Zagzebski’s model offers a viable alternative for the renewal of religious ethics in contemporary philosophy—one that is both faithful to theological tradition and responsive to the demands of reflective moral agency.